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Rebellious Lawyering in the Courts of the 
Conqueror: The Legacy of the Hirabayashi Coram 
Nobis Case1 
Natsu Taylor Saito2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is an honor to participate in this tribute to the late Gordon Hirabayashi 
and those who worked for many decades to ensure that his commitment to 
upholding constitutional principles, regardless of personal cost, would be 
recognized in the courts of law and history. 
Like many others in the Japanese American community, I must 
acknowledge a personal debt to those who resisted, from inside and outside 
the camps, the forced relocation and mass internment of our families, as 
well as my appreciation for those who worked for many decades to 
challenge the mainstream legal and historical narratives of that internment. 
Their willingness to engage in a classic “lost cause”—confronting the 
conclusions not only of the executive and legislative branches of 
government and the military, but the United States Supreme Court as 
well—allowed our internee parents and grandparents to hold their heads 
high, and our children to be proud of their histories. 
                                                        
1 This article originates in Natsu Taylor Saito’s February 2012 presentation at The 25th 
Anniversary of the United States v. Hirabayashi Coram Nobis Case: Its Meaning Then 
and Its Relevance Now, a conference hosted by Seattle University School of Law’s Fred 
T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality. 
2 Natsu Taylor Saito is a law professor at Georgia State University College of Law. The 
author is grateful to all of the Hirabayashi conference organizers, supporters, and 
participants, and to the staff and editors of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice. Special 
thanks to Lori Bannai, Peggy Nagae, and Eric Yamamoto for their always inspirational 
work for social justice, and to Roger Daniels for making so much Japanese American 
internment history accessible. 
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Before considering the role of the Hirabayashi coram nobis case3 in the 
context of this legacy, I would like to acknowledge that, in Seattle, 
Washington, we are on or near lands of—among others—the Suquamish, 
Duwamish, Nisqually, and Puyallup peoples who have been dispossessed, 
forcibly “evacuated,” and interned by the United States.4 They have 
received no meaningful redress for these wrongs, and their histories cannot 
be relegated to an abstract “past” any more than those of the Japanese 
American community. Discussing the injustices suffered by American 
Indians when the US government arbitrarily placed the Poston internment 
camp on the Colorado River Reservation, the late professor Chris Iijima 
observed, “The ironies . . . [of] a concentration camp for citizens 
imprisoned as foreign aliens built on land that served as a prison for original 
inhabitants created by conquering invaders . . . would be poetic if not so 
tragic.”5 I believe that the effectiveness of our challenges to the Japanese 
American internment is best measured by the extent to which they further 
                                                        
3 Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (vacating Gordon 
Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating the wartime curfew and evacuation orders). See 
also Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating Fred 
Korematsu’s conviction for violating the evacuation order). For background on the 
Korematsu coram nobis case, see generally Marilyn Hall Patel et al., Justice Restored: 
The Legacy of Korematsu II and the Future of Civil Liberties, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 215 
(2009). The conviction of a third resister, Minoru Yasui, was also vacated, but without 
the court addressing his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. His appeal on this issue was 
mooted by his death in 1986. See Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 831 (1987); see also Peggy Nagae, Justice and Equity for Whom? 
A Personal Journey and Local Perspective on Community Justice and Struggles for 
Dignity, 81 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1138–42 (2002). For background, see Kerry S. Hada, 
Andrew S. Hamano, Minoru Yasui, 27 COLO. LAW. 9 (1998). 
4 See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTROVERSY: FISHING 
RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 3–40 (1970); see 
generally VINE DELORIA, JR., INDIANS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: FROM THE COMING 
OF THE WHITE MAN TO THE PRESENT DAY (1977). 
5 Chris K. Iijima, Reparations and the “Model Minority” Ideology of Acquiescence: 
The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV. 385, 387 
(1998). He went on to note his realization that “this sad story of the past was a metaphor 
for an equally sad future if the lessons of internment and redress were not heeded.” Id. 
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the struggles of other peoples subjected to violations of fundamental human 
rights. 
This essay is a reflection on what the coram nobis cases, which 
overturned the convictions of those who resisted internment, can teach us as 
we engage in contemporary struggles to further social justice. Section II 
considers the impact of Gordon Hirabayashi’s legal victory on the 
protection of fundamental human rights in the United States, and Section III 
assesses the ruling in terms of the broader purposes of legal redress. Two 
lessons I have learned from the Hirabayashi case are outlined briefly in 
Section IV. The first is that engaging in community-based lawyering can 
help us creatively expand the options for attaining social justice within the 
parameters of our domestic legal system. The second is that if we allow 
ourselves to think outside the box, emerging international human rights 
norms can help us envision a much broader array of options that further 
human dignity and justice. 
II. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CORAM NOBIS DECISIONS 
In 1987, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Gordon 
Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating the curfew and evacuation orders 
imposed upon all persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast during 
World War II.6 Judge Mary Schroeder’s opinion concluded that the 
Supreme Court upheld Hirabayashi’s conviction in 1943 because it had 
been misled by the government. In reaching this conclusion, Judge 
Schroeder acknowledged the significance of the revised historical narrative 
that, as a result of the insistence of lawyers, scholars, and Japanese 
                                                        
6 Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 591. The action was initiated as a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis, a rarely used avenue for challenging a criminal conviction based upon newly 
discovered evidence. See Eric W. Scharf & Wayne R. Atkins, Coram What? An 
Introduction to Federal Special Writs, 85 FLA. B.J. 89, 91 (2011). 
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American activists, had replaced the prevailing myth that the government’s 
action had been based on military necessity.7 
Of course, the Ninth Circuit could not overturn the precedent established 
by the Supreme Court’s wartime internment decisions.8 Nonetheless, the 
Hirabayashi coram nobis opinion, together with a district court decision 
vacating Fred Korematsu’s conviction,9 seemed to signify that the judiciary 
would no longer simply accept the government’s word that national security 
required draconian measures based upon race or national origin. As the 
court stated in the Korematsu coram nobis case, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Korematsu, as historical precedent, “stands as a constant caution 
that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be 
vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees.”10 
The legal and political developments of the post-9/11 “war on terror” 
have forced us to reconsider this assessment. Some of the more troubling 
developments include the disappearance and arbitrary detention of Muslims 
and Arab Americans in the months immediately after September 11, 2001,11 
as well as their continued detention at the Guantánamo Bay naval base;12 
the increase in the use and apparent acceptability of racial and ethnic 
profiling,13 as well as increasingly harsh immigration policies;14 the 
                                                        
7 Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 593. 
8 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 41 (1943) (upholding the curfew); Yasui v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (upholding the curfew); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the evacuation); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) 
(holding that citizens found to be “loyal” could not continue to be detained). For an 
excellent contemporaneous analysis of these cases, see generally Eugene V. Rostow, The 
Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). 
9 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
10 Id. at 1420. 
11 See BARBARA OLSHANSKY, DEMOCRACY DETAINED: SECRET UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICES IN THE U.S. WAR ON TERROR 13–45 (2007). 
12 See id. at 85–149. 
13 See Tanya E. Coke, Racial Profiling Post-9/11: Old Story, New Debate, in LOST 
LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 91–111 (Cynthia 
Brown, ed. 2003); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 
1576–82 (2002). 
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invocation of national security to constrict civil rights and liberties15 and to 
justify the use of military force in violation of international law;16 the 
legitimization of secret renditions and torture;17 and the recent authorization 
of not only the indefinite detention, but also the assassination of American 
citizens.18 
Many scholars have referenced the Japanese American internment as a 
dangerous precedent of these post-9/11 practices.19 Federal courts have 
imposed some limitations on the detention of “enemy combatants.”20 
                                                                                                                     
14 See Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security 
After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
1369, 1396–1403 (2007); see generally M. Isabel Medina, Immigrants and the 
Government’s War on Terrorism, 6 CENTENNIAL REV. 225 (2006). 
15 See Nancy Chang, How Democracy Dies: The War on Our Civil Liberties, in LOST 
LIBERTIES, supra note 13, at 33–51. 
16 See, e.g., Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring 
Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 77, 122–26 (2010) (arguing that US drone attacks in Pakistan violate 
international law); Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes in Response to Terrorism Can 
Pose Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5201 (2009). 
17 See generally THE UNITED STATES AND TORTURE: INTERROGATION, 
INCARCERATION, AND ABUSE (Marjorie Cohn, ed. 2011). 
18 See Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., 10 Reasons The U.S. is No Longer the Land of the Free, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-the-united-
states-still-the-land-of-the-free/2012/01/04/gIQAvcD1wP_story.html; Peter M. Shane, 
The Obama Administration and the Prospects for a Democratic Presidency in a Post-
9/11 World, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 27, 35–41 (2012) (discussing the administration’s 
argument against judicial review of its killing of US citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi). 
19 See, e.g., Evelyn Gong, A Judicial “Green Light” for the Expansion of Executive 
Power: The Violation of Constitutional Rights and the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the 
Japanese American Internment and the Post-9/11 Detention of Arab and Muslim 
Americans, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 275 (2007); Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: 
The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 307 (2006); Roger Daniels, The Japanese American Cases, 1942–2004: A 
Social History, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (2005); Chris K. Iijima, Shooting 
Justice Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Abdication at the 
Convergence of Korematsu and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109 (2004). 
20 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that federal district courts have 
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(holding that an American citizen captured overseas in combat has some procedural 
rights). 
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Nonetheless, as Professor Jerry Kang observes, these and other detainee 
cases have misconstrued Ex parte Endo and resurrected the 1943 
Hirabayashi opinion without acknowledging the significance of the coram 
nobis decision.21 Some of us have argued that the Supreme Court’s recent 
national security jurisprudence is consistent not only with the internment 
cases, but also with its longstanding support for the exercise of plenary 
power by the executive and legislative branches of government.22 Thus, for 
example, the Chinese Exclusion Cases laid the foundation for the indefinite 
detention of non-citizens23 and the Insular cases held that constitutional 
protections need not be extended to “unincorporated” territories like Puerto 
Rico.24 When added to the Japanese American internment cases, there is 
ample precedent for the indefinite detention of “enemy combatants” at the 
US naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.25 The question we confront today 
is how we assess the Hirabayashi and Korematsu coram nobis cases in light 
of the political and legal developments of the past decade. 
I do not have an easy answer to this question. On the one hand, 
everything I know about Supreme Court jurisprudence confirms Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s frank acknowledgement in Johnson v. McIntosh 
that these are the “courts of the conqueror,”26 and we would be fools to 
expect them to act any differently. In McIntosh, the question was whether a 
                                                        
21 See Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s 
Shadow, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 264–78 (2005). 
22 See generally NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTÁNAMO 
BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE (2007) [hereinafter SAITO, FROM 
CHINESE EXCLUSION]. 
23 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United 
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
853 (1987). 
24 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 
U.S. 298 (1922). See generally Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American 
Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225 (1996). 
25 See generally Kristine A. Huskey, Guantánamo and Beyond: Reflections on the Past, 
Present, and Future of Preventive Detention, 9 U. N.H. L. Rev. 183 (2011). 
26 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823). 
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tract of land in Illinois rightfully belonged to one white settler who traced 
his title to a grant from the British Crown, or another who traced his title to 
the same land to a purchase from the indigenous owners.27 This forced the 
Court to address the underlying validity of the United States’ claim to the 
lands it occupies. 
Rejecting American Indians’ rights under natural law to territories where 
they had lived since time immemorial,28 Justice Marshall concluded that 
“[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, 
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, 
respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully 
asserted.”29 He continued, “[a]lthough we do not mean to engage in the 
defence of those principles . . . they may, we think, find some excuse, if not 
justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have 
been wrested from them.”30 The opinion then describes the “Indians 
inhabiting this country” as “fierce savages, whose occupation was war.”31 
While the rhetoric has softened a bit, this decision and its race-based 
reasoning still undergirds federal law governing American Indian nations 
today.32 Race-based fears were similarly invoked by the Supreme Court in 
its 1944 Korematsu opinion,33 and we continue to see racial and ethnic 
stereotypes employed to justify a wide range of otherwise unconstitutional 
                                                        
27 Id. at 543. For analysis, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN 
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 308–17 (1990). 
28 WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 309. 
29 McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 588. 
30 Id. at 589. 
31 Id. at 590. 
32 See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST 
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, LOADED WEAPON]. 
33 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233–42 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also WILLIAMS, 
LOADED WEAPON, supra note 32, at 22–30. 
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measures and to preserve a status quo founded on countless injustices.34 It is 
difficult to contest the theory that subordinated groups only achieve legal 
victories to the extent that their interests converge with those of the 
powerful.35 
Nonetheless, I could not function as a lawyer and law professor if I did 
not believe that the rule of law really is a foundational principle, accepted 
(in principle) even by those whose aim is to maintain the status quo. I 
always begin my Professional Responsibility course with Justice at 
Nuremberg (the Spencer Tracy film about the trial of German judges)36 
because it brings home the extraordinarily important precept that, as 
lawyers, we have a particular responsibility to further the rule of law and 
ensure that law enforcement is not just about might (or political expediency) 
making right.37 
                                                        
34 See generally Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial 
Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 24 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
35  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).  
This principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interests of blacks in 
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with 
the interests of whites. However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, 
will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for 
blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior social status of middle 
and upper class whites. 
Id. 
36 JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (United Artists 1961). For an excellent description of this 
film, see Major Ann B. Ching, Lessons from the Silver Screen: Must-See Movies for 
Military Lawyers ARMY LAW., Jan. 2010, at 108, 108–10. 
37 See Henry T. King, Jr., Robert Jackson’s Vision for Justice and Other Reflections of a 
Nuremberg Prosecutor, 88 GEO. L.J. 2421, 2427 (2000) (reviewing DREXEL A. 
SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR’S COMPREHENSIVE 
ACCOUNT (1999)). “The trial[s] weighed, for the first time in a truly international forum, 
the substitution of law for force in governing human relationships.” Id.  See also Telford 
Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488 (1955). On the trial of the judges, 
see generally Christiane Wilke, Reconsecrating the Temple of Justice: Invocations of 
Civilization and Humanity in the Nuremberg Justice Case, 24 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 181 
(2009). 
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III. CONSIDERING REMEDIAL OPTIONS 
With this dilemma in mind, what do the coram nobis cases teach us about 
working for social justice? The answer may well depend upon how we 
define success. Legal and political systems can provide a variety of 
remedies, and we may gain some insight into this issue by looking at the 
remedies obtained in the struggle to vindicate the rights of Japanese 
Americans. 
In 1947, those who resisted the draft from inside the camps were 
pardoned by President Truman.38 The coram nobis cases did not reverse the 
Supreme Court’s precedent upholding the Japanese American internment, 
and they came too late to alleviate the harm suffered by internment resisters 
Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Min Yasui.39 Yet they were real 
legal victories. Most immediately, they overturned the convictions at issue. 
Additionally, they helped lay the foundation for passage of the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988, which provided an official apology, payments of $20 
thousand to surviving internees, and a public education fund to help correct 
the historical record.40 All of this meant a great deal to the individual 
petitioners, to the Japanese American community, and to those who helped 
fight this battle to restore constitutional rights. 
The coram nobis decisions and the redress legislation also had significant 
symbolic value. In 1942, Gordon Hirabayashi wrote, “[h]ope for the future 
is exterminated.”41 He went on to explain that he could maintain his 
                                                        
38 ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II 182 (2001); see also Lorraine K. 
Bannai, Taking the Stand: The Lessons of Three Men Who Took the Japanese American 
Internment to Court, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1, 15–31 (2005). 
39 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United 
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 831 (1987). 
40 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989 (1988). For a brief history of the 
movement leading to its passage, see John Tateishi & William Yoshino, The Japanese 
American Incarceration: The Journey to Redress, HUM. RTS., Spring 2000, at 10. 
41 Gordon Hirabayashi, “Why I refused to register for evacuation,” May 13, 1942, 
quoted in Conference Brochure, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, The 
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principles and those expressed in the Constitution, as well as his own 
“incentive to live,” only by refusing to comply with the curfew and 
evacuation orders.42 The coram nobis decisions and the provisions of the 
Civil Liberties Act did much to restore this hope, not only to Gordon 
Hirabayashi, but to the Japanese American community more generally. But 
we are still left with the question of their seemingly limited ability to protect 
the rights of others going forward. 
When large-scale human rights violations are at issue, the first step is 
often truth and acknowledgement. The Hirabayashi coram nobis opinion 
acknowledged historical realities that had, to that point, been distorted or 
omitted from the dominant narrative.43 Moreover, without this and the 
Korematsu coram nobis decision, we would have no official recognition 
that the curfew, evacuation, and internment processes were unlawful. As 
human rights activists and critical race theorists have discussed, correcting 
the narrative, and thereby ensuring that the historical record reflects 
accurately the lived experiences of those whose rights have been violated, is 
of tremendous significance.44 
Acknowledgment is most powerful when it comes from the perpetrator of 
the wrong, and not simply from the court. We know, for example, how 
meaningful the US government’s apology was for many Japanese American 
                                                                                                                     
25th Anniversary of the United States v. Hirabayashi Coram Nobis Case: Its Meaning 
Then and Its Relevance Now, available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Documents/ 
korematsu/2012HirabayashiProgram.pdf. 
42 Id. 
43 On the significance of narrative to all law, see generally Robert M. Cover, Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
44 See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to 
the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 
IOWA L. REV. 803, 804 (1994); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal 
Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 1241, 1268–69 (1993); see generally Richard Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). 
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internees.45 This is why it is significant that in May 2011, Acting Solicitor 
General Neal Katyal issued a “confession of error” on behalf of the Solicitor 
General’s Office, acknowledging its failure to disclose evidence to the 
Supreme Court that contradicted the government’s position that Japanese 
Americans posed a threat to the national security.46 The changes we have 
seen in how internment history is now taught probably would not have 
occurred without the courts’ holdings in the coram nobis cases or the Civil 
Liberties Act. 
But correcting the historical record is just one piece of the puzzle. After a 
wrong has been acknowledged, we get to the questions of what remedies 
would come closest to righting that wrong, and what actions would most 
effectively prevent recurrence of the injustice.47 Material compensation is a 
significant remedy, of course, but the $20 thousand payments to surviving 
internees did almost nothing to offset their actual losses and, thus, were 
largely symbolic.48 With respect to deterrence, it seems unlikely that 
Japanese Americans will be incarcerated en masse again, but it is not clear 
that other groups are less likely to be interned. 
This may be, at least in part, because no one has been held accountable. 
Even in Ex parte Endo, which held in December 1944 that there was no 
longer any legitimate reason to keep Japanese Americans incarcerated,49 
“the Supreme Court placed all blame on a little-known agency instead of on 
the actual political actors responsible.”50 The message of the Nuremberg 
                                                        
45 See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of 
Redress and Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 223, 227 (1992). 
46 Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the 
Japanese-American Internment Cases, JUST. BLOG (May 20, 2011), 
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1346. 
47 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 203 (2006). 
48 See SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 22, at 66–67 (noting the extent of 
uncompensated material losses). 
49 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
50 Kang, Watching the Watchers, supra note 21, at 269 (quoting Justice Roberts’ 
assessment that “[i]t is to hide one’s head in the sand to assert that the detention of 
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and Tokyo Tribunals was that where there are violations of fundamental 
human rights, the rule of law requires perpetrators to be held accountable.51 
Nonetheless, those who advocated and implemented the Japanese American 
internment were, in essence, rewarded for their actions through promotions 
and appointments to positions of greater influence and authority.52 
Another reason for the minimal deterrence resulting from social and legal 
acknowledgement that the Japanese American internment was unjust may 
be the mixed messages sent by the redress bill. As Chris Iijima observed, in 
the congressional debates over the Civil Liberties Act, the injustice of the 
internment was acknowledged, but 
all the glowing historical references centered around . . . political 
and ideological positions that justified and accommodated the 
decision to intern Japanese-Americans. Those who at the time of 
internment saw it for the injustice and outrage that it was and chose 
to dissent continue to be silenced and unheralded. . . . In essence, 
what Americans were being told [was that] the kind of patriotism 
that does not resist injustice . . . gets rewarded.53 
                                                                                                                     
[Endo] resulted from an excess of authority by subordinate officials.” 323 U.S. at 309 
(Roberts, J., concurring)). 
51 See Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg’s Trials’ 
Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 
ALB. L. REV. 321, 326 (2008). 
52 For example, Karl Bendetsen, primary author of DeWitt’s Final Report became 
Undersecretary of the Army; Attorney General Francis Biddle represented the United 
States at the Nuremberg trials; Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy was appointed 
founding president of what became the World Bank; Tom Clark, the Justice Department 
liaison to the War Relocation Authority became the US Attorney General and then a 
Supreme Court justice; and Earl Warren, a strong proponent of internment, was elected 
governor of California and appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See SAITO, 
FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 22, at 304 n.319. 
53 Chris K. Iijima, Political Accommodation and the Ideology of the “Model Minority”: 
Building a Bridge to White Minority Rule in the 21st Century, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
1, 10–11 (1998). See also Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese 
American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 
(2001). On the complex legacy of redress, see generally Victor Bascara, Cultural Politics 
of Redress: Reassessing the Meaning of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 after 9/11, 10 
ASIAN L.J. 185 (2003). 
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Such messages, of course, are unlikely to deter future wrongdoing or 
encourage resistance to injustice. 
IV. MOVING FORWARD 
This returns us to the tension between a theoretical commitment to the 
rule of law and the realities of power. In considering how we move forward, 
I would like to focus on two points. 
The first is that lawyering grounded in and responsive to community-
based social and political movements can inspire us to develop creative 
options, to push the edges of the legal envelope. 
The second is that we do not need to limit our thinking to currently 
available options, even those at the edges. Nothing prevents us from 
envisioning rights and remedial options outside the box. In expanding our 
vision of the possible, we can learn much from the dynamic and emerging 
field of international human rights law. Thoughtful legal experts from 
around the world have spent the last half-century articulating broad 
understandings of rights and responsibilities, and means for their 
implementation. This body of law is not necessarily enforceable in US 
courts today, but it illustrates the potential for creative thinking about the 
relationship of law to justice and human dignity. 
A. Creative Use of Domestic Legal Options 
One of the central messages of the trial of the judges at Nuremberg was 
that the form of law must not be allowed to undermine the substance of the 
law, and this substance, in turn, should be rooted in an international norm of 
“humanity.”54 If we are to implement this mandate, we cannot let the 
prospect of losing in court deter us. The Supreme Court had given its stamp 
of approval to the internment by upholding the convictions of Gordon 
                                                        
54 See Wilke, supra note 37, at 182–83 (referencing United States v. Altstoetter (the 
“Justice Case”), TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, vol. 3 (1951)). 
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Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Min Yasui in the 1940s,55 and their 
coram nobis legal teams were confronted with what, to all appearances, was 
a legal dead end. But these individuals and the Japanese American 
community knew not only that an injustice had occurred, but also that it had 
set a dangerous legal precedent. They recognized all too clearly that, as 
Justice Robert Jackson observed, the Court had left the government a 
“loaded weapon” with which to deprive others of their constitutional rights 
in the future.56 
Refusing to accept the finality of this particular legal status quo, the 
coram nobis teams came up with creative options. Gerald Lopez has 
discussed at some length how we can transform the practice of law from 
“regnant lawyering” to “rebellious lawyering,” which is more directly 
responsive to the needs of our clients and communities.57 Building on this 
framework, Angelo Ancheta has addressed how we can be more rooted in 
our communities, serving as lawyer-educators and lawyer-organizers as 
well as strictly legal representatives.58 The coram nobis cases are a great 
example of such “rebellious” lawyering. 
Community lawyering recognizes the overlapping, interconnected— 
indeed organic—relationship between legal work and broader, community-
based movements; it is essential to furthering justice.59 In other words, if we 
are to do more than grease the wheels of the conqueror’s courts, our work 
                                                        
55 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 41 (1943) (upholding the curfew); Yasui v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (upholding the curfew); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the evacuation); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)  
(holding that citizens found to be “loyal” could not continue to be detained). 
56 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
57 See GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO LAWYER’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). 
58 Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REV.1363 (1993) (reviewing 
LOPEZ, supra note 57). 
59 See generally LOPEZ, supra note 57; Ancheta, supra note 58. For an overview of the 
evolution of community-based lawyering, see generally Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. 
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001). 
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must be rooted in and reflective of the needs, aspirations, and agency of the 
communities we represent. 
A critical element of this process is the creation of public space for the 
perspectives of our clients and their communities. As the late professor 
Derrick Bell summarized: 
The narrative voice, the teller is important . . . in a way not 
understandable by those whose voices are tacitly deemed 
legitimate and authoritarian. The voice exposes, tells and retells, 
signals resistance and caring, and reiterates what kind of power is 
feared most—the power of commitment to change.60 
Another critical element is sharing with these communities our 
understandings of what has, historically, made for successful legal 
challenges—debunking the myth that a good lawyer just needs to get a case 
into court, and illustrating how the underlying educational efforts, social 
awareness, and political pressure were critical to the successes that are held 
out as proof that the system “works.” 
Innovative, humanity-focused lawyering helps us stretch common 
understandings of what falls within the realm of legal remedies. The coram 
nobis cases took a remedy at the “edge” of the box and infused it with new 
life and meaning. Similarly, the human rights cases that have been brought 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act illustrate the importance of utilizing 
remedies that are theoretically available within our legal system, but rarely 
utilized.61 In turn, this kind of rebellious lawyering can open up space for 
effective community mobilizing. 
                                                        
60 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 
907 (1995). For a delightful explanation of this point in the context of effective legal 
education see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1997). 
61 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see, e.g., Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing relatives of a torture victim to sue Paraguayan officials 
in federal district court). Such claims were limited but not eliminated by Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). On the evolution of this avenue of redress, see PETER 
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A symbiotic relationship of this sort seems to have been missing in our 
efforts to protect constitutional rights in the so-called war on terror. Many 
lawyers and legal scholars have criticized government policies as unwise 
and often unconstitutional,62 but my impression is that we have relied on 
legal challenges and rhetorical critiques in something of a vacuum, rather 
than being rooted in social movements opposing the practices at issue.63 
Contrast, for example, the Occupy movement with the fairly intellectual 
realm of war on terror critiques.64 The Occupy movement illustrates that 
large sectors of the American people are quite capable of mobilizing when 
they believe their well-being is at stake, and the lack of a similar response to 
post-9/11 injustices says a lot about their perceptions of their interests. The 
same was true, of course, at the time of the Japanese American internment. 
There was widespread discomfort, at least among those who considered 
themselves liberals, but not enough to warrant social mobilization.65 
The lesson here could be that we need to think about the structural 
deficiencies in American politics and education. Perhaps a more accurate 
understanding of history would lead to wider awareness that the loss of 
constitutional rights is never limited to one target group. My take, however, 
is that those who are truly affected are perfectly clear about what is 
                                                                                                                     
HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LAW, HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 23–88 (2009). 
62 See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2d ed., 2002); 
NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: HOW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-
TERRORISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES (2002). 
63 See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel 
the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2005). 
64 See generally Bruce van Voorst, What Occupy has Taught America, HOLLAND 
SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 2167667; Heather Maher & Nikola 
Krastev, In United States, “Occupy Wall Street” Movement Gains Supporters, RADIO 
FREE EUR. DOCUMENTS, Oct. 5, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 20389765. 
65 See, e.g., PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT CASES 128–34 (1983) (noting the reluctance of the American Civil 
Liberties Union to challenge the internment). 
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happening, but they do not see a meaningful way to bring their collective 
power to bear on the system. If this is correct, being rooted in the 
communities we hope to serve is necessary but insufficient. In order to 
serve as catalysts for meaningful legal justice, we must also help create a 
legal system that more broadly encompasses community concerns. In this 
effort, the emerging body of international human rights law and institutions 
can play a vital role. This is not because international law is creating new 
rights, but because it articulates and, therefore, lends weight to basic 
concepts so often excluded from the legal arena. This body of law can help 
us not only in pushing the edges of the legal envelope, but in expanding the 
framework of legal options in substantive ways. 
B. Utilizing International Human Rights Law 
American jurisprudence has been carefully honed to ensure that these 
remain the courts of the conqueror. The odds are weighted against those 
who advocate for fundamental social change.66 As a result, if we are to 
engage in rebellious lawyering rather than serve as functionaries of the 
status quo, we need to assess the significance of a legal victory not simply 
in terms of whether our clients are the “prevailing” party, but in terms of the 
justice that has (or has not) been achieved. This requires expanding our 
vision of both rights and remedies.67 
Our domestic legal system provides a limited array of remedies for 
acknowledged violations of law, and these are usually highly 
individualized. In criminal cases, convictions may be overturned, as they 
were in the coram nobis cases. Correcting wrongful convictions is 
extremely important, but it does not address the months, years, or decades 
                                                        
66 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 3–6 (1993) (noting 
problems with the tendency of the Supreme Court to uphold the status quo). 
67 For a helpful overview of the evolution of reparations theory and a proposed 
reparations-as-repair model, see Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory 
and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Yamamoto et 
al., American Reparations]. 
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lost to legal battles or incarceration, or the time, energy, money, and 
damage to health or reputation, incurred in the process. Substantive 
remedies must be sought in civil suits, where it is generally presumed that 
money is the best and most adequate compensation. Only rarely have the 
political branches of government intervened to provide restorative justice. 
International human rights law expands our options by recognizing a 
wider range of remedies. Among other things, it articulates the right to a 
remedy, acknowledges collective as well as individual rights and remedies, 
recognizes that financial compensation is often inadequate to fully address 
human rights violations, and emphasizes the importance of the victims’ 
assessment of the adequacy of remedial options.68 Moreover, it expands our 
substantive ability to achieve justice through law by acknowledging that we 
have a responsibility to resist unlawful state action, and by incorporating a 
liberatory perspective grounded in the notion of human dignity and the right 
to self-determination.69 
International law thus provides us a realistic vision—though by no means 
the only one—of what could be. It is a complex and evolving system, 
hammered out by hundreds of legal experts meeting over many decades to 
consider how aspirational norms can be implemented. Even when not 
immediately enforceable, human rights law can “slowly change attitudes in 
large populations, leading to shifts in ideas of appropriate state behavior,” 
and “international legal norms may well empower constituencies within a 
domestic polity and provide them with a language for influencing state 
policy.”70 International perspectives have the potential to “illuminate . . . the 
significance of human rights redress litigation”; to help achieve acceptance 
of responsibility for historic injustices; “offer insights into the 
                                                        
68 See infra notes 71–87 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 88–102 and accompanying text. 
70 Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1265, 1266 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)). 
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reconstruction dimension of social healing”; and “engage and mobilize new 
constituencies” through “cross-border alliances.”71 To illustrate this 
potential, I would like to point out a few salient features about remedies and 
rights in international law. 
First, international law recognizes that remedies must be provided.72 As 
Dinah Shelton summarizes, there are some one hundred global and regional 
human rights treaties, most providing for “both the procedural right of 
effective access to a fair hearing and the substantive right to a remedy.”73 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for 
example, does not mandate specific remedies for violations of the rights it 
articulates, but it requires parties to provide remedies that are “effective, of 
a legal nature and enforceable.”74 The International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) requires states 
to ensure effective protection from acts of racial discrimination violating 
fundamental rights, as well as the right to seek “just and adequate reparation 
or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.”75 
Even when treaties do not explicitly articulate the right to a remedy, it has 
long been established, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated 
in 1927, “that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparations in an adequate form.”76 
                                                        
71 Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 67, at 51–52. For an examination 
of such benefits in the context of Puerto Rico and other US colonies, see generally 
Ediberto Román, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable Hurdles 
and Yet Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369 (2002). 
72 This is also a foundational premise of US law. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
163 (1803) (stating the United States will cease to be a government of laws “if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right”). 
73 DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 14–15 (1999).  
For more details on particular treaties, see id. at 15–37. See also Bassiouni, supra note 
47, at 215 n.47. On the right to reparations for violations of international humanitarian 
law, see id. at 217 n.61. 
74 Bassiouni, supra note 47, at 214 (explaining the provisions of ICCPR Art. 2(3)). 
75 ICERD, Art. 6. See also Bassiouni, supra note 47, at 215. 
76 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26). 
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Second, international human rights law recognizes that groups, as well as 
individuals, have legally cognizable rights to remedies for collective 
injustices. This allows for remedies that address structural dynamics, 
including the intergenerational harm that often accompanies large-scale 
trauma.77 This concept is explained in more detail by Yamamoto, Kim, and 
Holden’s description of “social healing through justice,” a construct that not 
only incorporates the need for material compensation, but understands that 
serious harms damage not just individuals but communities, and that 
“[g]roup healing requires some combination of recognition, responsibility, 
reconstruction, and reparation.”78 
Third, international law recognizes that financial compensation, while 
often critical, is generally insufficient. In 2006, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law.79 Recognizing that “victims often desire that their suffering be 
acknowledged, their violators condemned and their dignity restored through 
some form of public remembrance,”80 this document spells out steps for 
implementing the right to equal and effective access to justice, the right to 
adequate, effective, and prompt reparations for the harm suffered, and the 
right to truth.81 
                                                        
77 See Yael Danieli, Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and Their Legacy: The Role of 
Victims in International Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633, 1635–37 (2006). 
78 Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 66, at 48–49. See also ERIC K. 
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL 
RIGHTS AMERICA 153–70 (1999). 
79 G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006); see generally Bassiouni, 
supra note 47, at 247–58. 
80 Bassiouni, supra note 47, at 231. For an application of this precept to post-9/11 torture 
victims, see generally Kim D. Chanbonpin, “We Don’t Want Dollars, Just Change”: 
Narrative Counter-Terrorism Strategy, An Inclusive Model for Social Healing, and the 
Truth about Torture Commission, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2011). 
81 Bassiouni, supra note 47, at 260. For a more detailed explanation, see id. at 260–76. 
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The Basic Principles further articulate four dimensions of reparations: (1) 
restitution, designed to restore the victim as nearly as possible to the 
position they occupied prior to the harm; (2) compensation for damages that 
can be economically redressed; (3) rehabilitation, encompassing medical, 
psychological, social, and legal services; and (4) guarantees that the wrong 
will not be repeated.82 This comprehensive approach is reflected in the 2007 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which, among other 
things, recognizes that when their traditional lands, territories, or resources 
have been unlawfully taken or damaged, indigenous peoples have a right to 
redress that includes restitution, not simply monetary damages.83 
The final point I would like to make with respect to remedies is that 
international human rights law is much more open than US law to the 
perspectives of those whose rights have been violated (the “victims”).84 In 
the context of hate speech, Professor Mari Matsuda has noted that “[t]he 
failure to hear the victim’s story results in an inability to give weight to 
competing values of constitutional dimension.”85 International law 
emphasizes the importance of victims’ perspectives, not only with respect to 
hate crimes but to all human rights violations.86 Thus, the 2006 Basic 
Principles and Guidelines were “drafted from a ‘victim-based 
perspective.’”87 This perspective recognizes that if remedies are actually 
meant to make the victims “whole,” those whose rights have been violated, 
not the perpetrators, must have the primary say over what constitutes 
                                                        
82 Id. at 267–75. See also Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral 
Agency and the Role of Victims in Reparations Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 257, 260–
66 (2009) (discussing beneficial and detrimental aspects of these options); Roy L. 
Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 475, 475–77 (2003) (distinguishing compensatory and rehabilitative reparations). 
83 G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), Arts. 26, 28. 
84 See generally Danieli, supra note 77. 
85 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2376 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Public Response]. 
86 On hate speech, see id. at 2341–48. 
87 Bassiouni, supra note 47, at 251. 
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meaningful redress. Otherwise, as Carlton Waterhouse reminds us, 
“[e]fforts to redress past harms can actually be counter-productive, cruel, or 
insulting when they are not accompanied by actions that attend to both the 
needs and agency of the injured group.”88 
In addition to broadening remedial options, international law is 
significant to any quest for social justice because it reframes our collective 
understanding of rights and responsibilities. First, in accordance with the 
underlying premise of the Nuremberg trials, it acknowledges that we have 
not just a right but a duty to oppose governmental actions that violate the 
most fundamental of human rights.89 But human rights law is not just about 
deterring crimes against humanity or limiting the repressive powers of 
government. Its real significance lies in its vision of liberating human 
potential. 
The most important precept of human rights law is that human dignity 
must be recognized and protected. The preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights begins by stating that “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”90 It was this dignity for which Gordon Hirabayashi fought, and this 
dignity that Mari Matsuda invokes when she notes that “[r]eparations 
recognizes the personhood of victims. Lack of legal redress for racist acts is 
                                                        
88 Carleton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: 
A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from 1619 to 1972, and a Challenge 
to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 222 
(2006). 
89 See Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 414–16 (1989) (discussing the “Citizen’s Duty” defense). 
90 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The ICESCR and ICCPR preambles incorporate this 
language, “recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.” G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, 52 U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/21/2200. See generally Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008). 
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an injury often more serious than the acts themselves, because it signifies 
the political non-personhood of victims.”91 
Human dignity encompasses not only the notion that individuals should 
be respected and treated equally, but that we have the collective right—
some would say responsibility—to create social, political, cultural, 
educational, and legal systems that allow our communities to survive and 
flourish. For some of us old enough to remember the 1960s and early 1970s, 
the spirit of “the movement” still has resonance because it embodied a 
collective energy and hope based not just on the prospect of equal rights and 
equal access, but of liberation, self-determination, and community 
empowerment.92 
In turn, these efforts to address domestic inequities were inspired by the 
wave of decolonization movements sweeping Africa and Asia,93 and the 
massive opposition to military dictatorships in Latin America.94 The 
potential we saw for restructuring whole societies—economically, 
politically, and socially—allowed us to consider what real social justice 
                                                        
91 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 390 (1987). 
92 See generally, e.g., LAURA PULIDO, BLACK, BROWN, YELLOW, AND LEFT: RADICAL 
ACTIVISM IN LOS ANGELES 89–122 (2006); George Katsiaficas, Organization and 
Movement: The Case of the Black Panther Party and the Revolutionary People’s 
Constitutional Convention of 1970, in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION, AND THE BLACK 
PANTHER PARTY 141–55 (Kathleen Cleaver & George Katsiaficas eds., 2001); Students 
for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement, in THE SIXTIES PAPERS: 
DOCUMENTS OF A REBELLIOUS DECADE 176–196 (Judith Clavir Albert & Stewart 
Edward Albert eds., 1984). 
93 See, e.g., Stokely Carmichael, Pan Africanism, in STOKELY SPEAKS: BLACK POWER 
BACK TO PAN-AFRICANISM 183–220 (1972); see generally Christopher O’Sullivan, The 
United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1960–1994, 22 J. OF THIRD WORLD STUD., 103, 103 (2005), available at 
http://cuwhist.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/un-and-decolonization-in-africa.pdf. 
94 See generally Thomas C. Wright, Human Rights in Latin America: History and 
Projections for the Twenty-First Century, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 303, 308–13 (2000); 
Mikel Delagrange, Latin America: The Next Frontier for the ICC?, 5 FIU L. REV. 293, 
296–303 (2009). 
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might look like. As a result, there was a great deal of creative thinking, not 
just about the problems, but also about the solutions. 
I am oversimplifying here, but many of us shared a belief that if our 
children were not getting decent educations, the solution was not bussing or 
affirmative action (alternatives proffered by those who wished to maintain 
the status quo), but community-run schools.95 If the local hospital was 
closed, it could be taken over, and run by volunteers.96 Even Dr. King, in 
preparation for the Poor People’s Campaign, did not talk about maintaining 
a vigil at the Washington Monument, but about bringing business as usual 
to a halt.97  The goal was to effect change, not simply to register dissent. 
International law articulates rights that encompass such potentially 
liberatory options. The two foundational human rights treaties, the ICCPR 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), begin with a common article: “All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
                                                        
95 See, e.g., Erika Huggins, The Liberation Schools, the Children’s House, the 
Intercommunal Youth Institute and the Oakland Community School, BLACK 
COMMENTATOR, June 19, 2008, http://www.blackcommentator.com/282/282_iss_ 
oakland_community_school_huggins_guest.html; Mumia Abu-Jamal, A Life in the Party: 
An Historical and Retrospective Examination of the Projections and Legacies of the 
Black Panther Party, in IMAGINATION, AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 40, 47 
(discussing liberation schools run by the Black Panther Party); THE YOUNG LORDS: A 
READER 125–32 (Darrel Enck-Wanzer ed., 2010) (discussing community schools in the 
Puerto Rican community in New York). 
96 See, e.g., THE YOUNG LORDS, supra note 95, at 188–201 (on health care initiatives); 
Jennifer 8. Lee, The Young Lords’ Legacy of Puerto Rican Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
24, 2009, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/the-young-lords-legacy-of-
puerto-rican-activism/ (describing short-lived takeover of Lincoln Hospital in Brooklyn 
in 1970). 
97 See “King’s Last March,” available at http://www.blackcommentator.com/282/ 
282_iss_oakland_community_school_huggins_guest.html (last visited June 19, 2012) 
(noting Dr. King’s plan for the Poor People’s Campaign to “disrupt the daily functioning 
of the capital”); see generally Martin Luther King, Jr., Showdown for Nonviolence, in A 
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. 64–72 (James M. Washington ed., 1990). 
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status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”98 
These and other treaties go on to articulate rights to adequate healthcare, 
housing, education, working conditions, and participation in government, as 
well as freedom from all forms of discrimination or political oppression.99 
The right to self-determination is also the centerpiece of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.100 This declaration begins 
by affirming “that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while 
recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves 
different, and to be respected as such.”101 Among other provisions, it 
reiterates that indigenous peoples have collective rights, among them “the 
right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, 
social and cultural institutions” and “the right not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation.”102 
This emerging framework of the rights of peoples to determine, for 
themselves, what kind of government they want, and how social, cultural, 
economic, and educational institutions should be organized applies to all of 
us.103 It gives us opportunities to break out of the narrow parameters of due 
process and equal protection jurisprudence in which we so often find 
                                                        
98 ICCPR, art. 1; ICESCR, art. 1. On the evolving concept of self-determination, see 
Howard J. Vogel, Reframing Rights from the Ground Up: The Contribution of the New 
U.N. Law of Self-Determination to Recovering the Principle of Sociability on the Way to 
a Relational Theory of International Human Rights, 20 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 443, 
447–78 (2006). For a more orthodox summary, see generally Hurst Hannum, Rethinking 
Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1993). 
99 See, e.g., ICESCR art. 2(2) (non-discrimination), arts. 6–8 (working conditions), art. 
11 (adequate food, clothing, and housing), art. 12 (health), arts. 13–14 (education); 
ICCPR art. 2(1) (non-discrimination), art. 9 (liberty and security of person), arts. 18–19 
(freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and expression). 
100 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), esp. arts. 3–4, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/ 
unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
101 Id. at art. 1. 
102 Id. at arts. 5, 8. 
103 See, e.g., Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to African-
Americans, 29 SOUTHERN U. L. REV. 25 (2001). 
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ourselves mired, and to envision systems of governance and law truly 
reflecting the will of the people. 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
It may be that the legacy of the coram nobis cases is difficult to pin down 
because we are still creating it. These cases inspired us with the potential of 
creative, community-based lawyering that can be a springboard to thinking 
beyond the options presented to us, and to implementing community-based 
processes of meaningful justice. They encourage us to assess the adequacy 
of the “remedies” offered by the perpetrators of wrongs, rather than 
reinforcing the belief that those perpetrators have the ultimate say over what 
is possible. 
In our legal work, the coram nobis cases encourage us not only to 
represent our communities, but also to work with them towards liberatory 
visions of what could and should be available through law. It is easy to 
dismiss this notion as “unrealistic.” But the history of the courts of the 
conqueror illustrates all too realistically that the current legal framework is 
inadequate to ensure real justice. Mari Matsuda reminds us that “the limits 
of lawmaking imagination” can be “a disability, a blindness.”104 To get 
beyond these limits, we do not need to have success within reach; we only 
need to initiate the process. Encouraging us to “stand in the place where 
persons of courage have always stood, uncertain of victory but unafraid of 
defeat,” Derrick Bell recounted, “As the old black farmer who had left his 
fields to march from Selma to Montgomery said when asked whether they 
would win: ‘We won when we started.’”105 
 
                                                        
104 Matsuda, Public Response, supra note 85, at 2375. 
105 E-mail from Derrick Bell to author (Jan. 6, 2007) (on file with author). 
